CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL RECORD OF THE FIVE HUNDRED AND SIXTY-EIGHTH PLENARY MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 26 July 1990, at 10. a.m.

President: Mr. Bogumil Sujka (Poland)

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The PRESIDENT: I declare open the 568th plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament.

In accordance with its programme of work, the Conference continues today its consideration of agenda item 4, "Chemical weapons". However, in conformity with rule 30 of the rules of procedure, any member wishing to do so may raise any subject relevant to the work of the Conference.

I have on my list of speakers for today the representatives of the Netherlands and Indonesia. I now give the floor to the representative of the Netherlands, Ambassador Wagenmakers.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): On 6 February 1990, at the opening session of the Conference on Disarmament, the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs qualified the year 1989 as the year that marked the end of the post-war era. Indeed, 1989 was, in view of so many major political changes in Europe, a truly revoluntionary year. It is equally true that 1990 is the year in which a new architecture, and not just for Europe, will continue to take shape. The historical landmarks for that architecture seem to have been erected only recently. States have literally opened up and become receptive to a host of ideas and concepts, some old, some new. The internal developments in many European countries have had an immediate bearing on the perception of foreign and security policies. Seldom has a year been so fruitful as 1990, and we are only halfway through: the summit in Washington, the bilateral agreements between the United States and the USSR, the development towards German unification, the historic NATO meetings and their communiqués, the possibilities of agreements later this year on conventional forces in Europe as well as on confidence- and security-building measures, a CSCE summit and the strong probability that at the end of this year an agreement on strategic offensive arms will be signed by the Soviet Union and the United States.

From a global perspective, over recent years the enhanced role of the United Nations is clearly in evidence: effectively settling bloody conflicts which hitherto seemed not susceptible to mediation: the independence of Namibia, to mention just one example. Peace is breaking out, although regrettably not yet everywhere. Unfortunately, we witness areas of antagonism shifting from the East-West context into the third world. Proliferation of major weapon systems, be it conventional, chemical or of other types, is a worrisome corollary of that trend. In general, however, antagonism is yielding place to co-operation and trust. The threats to international security are diminishing, the international community can henceforth gradually start to focus its efforts on allocation of scarce resources to other objectives.

How does this rapidly changing environment affect the Conference on Disarmament? That is the first question I shall take up today. Secondly, what are the implications for nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear arms and testing issues? Thirdly, I intend to address our chemical weapons negotiations.

(Mr. Wagenmakers (Netherlands)

How then, to take up the first question, how then does the Conference on Disarmament avail itself of the historic opportunities offered in this revoluntionary age? Our awareness was first raised - this year - by the important message of Ambassador de Azambuja of Brazil on 8 February last. Many plenary statements since then have echoed his appeal.

Indeed, if we, in this forum, do not use up the full potential of the moment, there would be the real danger of losing the connection with political developments outside the CD, the link with reality to which the leader of the delegation of the Soviet Union referred so intriguingly the other day. I will not indulge in any speculation whether we have or have not, so far sufficiently grasped the opportunities which have presented themselves. What is more important is that we remain continuously alert to the possibilities which occur and that we do not shy away from the fact that dealing with reality is an infinitely more difficult and complex task than elaborating and stating theoretical goals. It is our task to grasp the immense potential of the moment. We should not allow ourselves to hang on to ossified ideas and thereby lose opportunities.

The fact that the CD has engaged in a realistic effort to streamline our negotiating schedules is warmly welcomed by the Netherlands. A better streamlining of our meeting schedules, which we always advocated, is, however, not an end in itself. What counts is that, as a result of such rescheduling, there will be increased possibility for consultations in our capitals and for going about our business on the basis of fresh instructions and ideas.

On another score we should not be loath to take a hard look at our agenda and the programme of work. Why not, pragmatically, decide to discontinue an endless round of unproductive meetings on a certain subject-matter if and when positions persistently remain too far apart for consensus to emerge? If we did so for the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, why not do so for other intractable issues? Like other delegations, mine is not convinced that the existence of agenda items 2 and 3 as separate entities is conducive to the structured approach these issues would warrant. My delegation is equally convinced that we should not shirk creative thinking on new topics for an agenda such as confidence-building measures and conventional and/or regional disarmament. I listened with great interest to what our distinguished colleague from Yugoslavia had to say on that score in our 567th meeting. Another topic, depending on the outcome of the BW Review Conference in 1991, may be biological weapons as well. Existing subjects, such as arms control in outer space, could, circumstances permitting, be viewed with a fresh look to identify areas of progress.

We welcome the increasing attendance and participation of observer countries. Indeed, some active observers have more impact on the negotiations than some CD members. Hopefully, the procedure applied this year for the admission of non-members can be followed again next year. Indeed, full participation in our day-to-day negotiations by those non-members who desire it constitutes an important element for achieving universality of disarmament agreements.

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Another matter, of equal importance, is that the CD has yet to implement its long-standing decision to expand its membership by four countries. Somehow, the implementation of this decision got thwarted. In order to get out of the present limbo, partial implementation of the 1984 decision seems called for, pending finalization of the choice of candidates of some groups.

It is to be welcomed that the thrust of many interventions in the CD this year has shown a fair degree of consensus on the necessity for this Conference to adapt to changing circumstances and priorities. The fact that this took some time in no way worries me. After all, we can only negotiate on the basis of consensus. If more radical change happens in the CD, then it will be both because of a then existing political will and because of a long preceding period of thought and preparation.

In the East-West context, member States of NATO and Warsaw Pact have shown themselves receptive to change. From being former opponents, they now consider joint statements on non-aggression and discuss a new security concept resulting in a defensive posture on both sides. But practical action too is envisaged. In this context I can mention specifically the Netherlands/Polish CFE trial inspection. If former adversaries can do so, we in the CD, partners in negotiations and consultations, should be able to sit down and tackle constructively the various issues which still divide us, be they global, regional or intraregional.

How, then, do these changes affect our work on the nuclear issues in the CD? The States assembled in the CD agree on the desirable outcome of a number of issues, for example nuclear disarmament. All of us agree that eventually we should reach the goal of a peaceful and stable world free of nuclear arms. We may disagree about the approach towards this goal and the determination of the political circumstances which will have to prevail for all States if they are indeed to engage in such far reaching nuclear disarmament.

Radical solutions rarely promote stability and this applies just as much, if not especially, to the case of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear weapons were and are, in the East-West context, essential components in an extremely complex security equation. That equation was more or less stable over a long period of time, but is now changing fast. The consequences of that change are not clear as yet, but the role of nuclear weapons in our defence will certainly become less prominent. For example, in their recent London summit Declaration on a transformed North Atlantic Alliance (document CD/1013), NATO members expressed their willingness to start negotiations on SNF and nuclear artillery in Europe. As far as the role of the remaining nuclear weapons is concerned, these weapons will truly be weapons of last resort. In the coming years those changes will also influence our discussion on security assurances toward non-nuclear-weapon States. My Government considers this issue to be of utmost importance; we regret the lack of results in the Ad hoc Committee on this issue.

Very soon most delegations present in this room will start their participation in the Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The NPT remains one of the most outstanding negotiating achievements and successful treaties of our time:

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a corner-stone for international stability. The support and commitment of the twelve member States of the European Community to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation were both clearly brought into focus by the important declaration on nuclear non-proliferation by the European Council in Dublin on 25 and 26 June last, the first of its kind by the Twelve. Allow me to quote the following: "The twelve member States of the European Community, parties to the NPT or not, will work actively to secure a successful outcome to the discussions which will take place in the forthcoming months, and in particular the deliberations of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT, and hope that those discussions will provide stable and assured solutions to the problems encountered by the international community in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons". End of quotation. It goes without saying that my delegation will be working to the best of its abilities for a successful outcome of the Review Conference, if possible through a substantive final declaration documenting the implementation of the Treaty provisions and the commitments in the 1985 Final Document. That will be another milestone on the road to 1995, when the Treaty will be up for extension. One of the linchpins of the NPT, but surely not the only one, is article VI. Its subject-matter should be seen in a broad perspective.

In a sense, debating non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is not a prerogative of the States parties to the NPT alone. Through in-depth and detailed discussion of various subjects of the nuclear items on our agenda, the Conference on Disarmament might contribute to a proper understanding of the essentials of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this context we witnessed a remarkable event only recently, that is, the participation of the American and Soviet negotiators to the Nuclear and Space Talks in an informal plenary session of the Conference on Disarmament, where their brief statements were followed by an ample exchange of questions and answers.

If one aspect emerged clearly from those discussions, it certainly was the fact that the future treaty on strategic offensive arms will effect significant reductions in strategic offensive arms, thereby increasing stability and lowering the risk of war. It will thus have an impact far beyond the direct bilateral scope of the treaty itself. We, therefore, sincerely hope that the timetable as set out by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev at their recent talks in Washington can be kept and that the signature of this treaty will be a fact by the end of 1990 or the beginning of 1991. In carrying through an important reduction of the "first strike" potential of both Parties involved, this Treaty will form an essential contribution to the creation of more strategic stability and the strengthening of international security. We welcome the fact that the United States and the USSR have also agreed to pursue new talks, after the signing of a START agreement, on further stabilizing reductions in the strategic arsenals of both countries.

It is not, however, only in the bilateral field on strategic offensive arms that prospects are good. Indeed, multilateral negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe are progressing steadily. The Netherlands puts the highest priority on completing this year the CFE treaty, which aims at reducing substantially the conventional armaments in Europe and eliminates as a matter of priority the capability for launching a surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action. One of the most remarkable features

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of the treaty is the intrusiveness of the envisaged verification régime. The Netherlands also favours the completion of a meaningful CSBM package. And reductions will continue. CSBMs will be further expanded.

The near-future potential for tangible success in arms control in Europe looks good. These are all steps achieved in relation to the nuclear and conventional components of disarmament under article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Of course, we are aware that certain States feel apprehensions about the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, article VI is repeatedly invoked to allege lack of progress on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The Netherlands rejects such accusations, and certainly now: the record on nuclear and conventional disarmament clearly shows the contrary. Although we have not yet reached the final goal spelled out in article VI, we are certainly on our way to implementing it in good faith. This is a fair truth and it needs to be said so accordingly.

In the debate on nuclear disarmament one cannot avoid mentioning the issue of testing. Early next year a major conference will take place to look into the possibility of converting the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water into a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We understand and respect the concerns of those States which have called for this "PTBT amendment conference". There is no doubt that, according to the Treaty, States have the right to call for or to propose amendments. If the Netherlands has any doubts concerning the expediency of such a conference, it does so mainly for practical reasons. It seems to us that the positions of various States on the issue of a comprehensive test ban are still much too far apart. Consensus on the issue eludes us so far. It seems, therefore, that the outcome of the conference will almost certainly not meet the hopes and efforts of the States which originally came forward with the idea of a Treaty amendment conference. After all, it is because of the fact that certain divergences of view proved insurmountable at the time of its creation, that the Partial Test Ban Treaty was given only limited scope. There is no indication that this situation has changed, notwithstanding the progress in seismic verification methods. The call for amending the Treaty is therefore premature.

Despite the doubts which my Government harbours on the procedure and the possible outcome of the Treaty amendment conference, it will participate in a positive spirit. A debate on the issue of nuclear tests might well lead to a better understanding of the issues involved. This would serve us all.

In the CD we have just reached agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee under agenda item 1, "Nuclear test ban". It took the CD years to achieve consensus on the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee. It was, indeed, an almost painful process and this by itself is a clear token of the complexity of the issue as well as of the clear emotions it carries with it. Here again we find no room for radical and simple solutions.

The Netherlands position on nuclear-testing limitations is clear and has been explained on a number of occasions: nuclear tests should be reduced both in number and in yield, concurrent with the ongoing process of deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. We do subscribe to the goal of a CTBT, the realization of which should be seen in the context of a process of disarmament. Along the

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road of reducing both nuclear weapons and the reliance on those weapons in the strategy of dissuasion, halting tests could be contemplated as a further stimulus to rid the world of nuclear weapons eventually.

Does this mean that the role of the Conference on Disarmament on the issue of a nuclear test ban is condemned and reduced to be a marginal one? No! The fact that the Ad hoc Committee's mandate provides for the initiation of substantive work on specific and interrelated test-ban issues, including verification and compliance, as well as structure and scope, in the framework of an ad hoc committee, is a clear indication of our common commitment. All of us do attach major political importance to paving the road, or, if you prefer, to preparing the ground for future negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

There are numerous aspects to be discussed, e.g. matters like an international seismic monitoring network, assessment of present and potential capabilities for monitoring compliance, the necessary institutional arrangements, other specific verification problems and new technologies. Solving these issues will be crucial for a future test-ban treaty. In view of their complexity it cannot be excluded that the actual agreement itself, the total cessation of nuclear tests, when time is ripe, will turn out to be the easiest part of all. In saying so, I refer to the encouragement to be taken from the agreements reached by the Soviet Union and the United States on threshold test-ban verification. We do hope and expect that they will continue along the same road and will speedily address the important issue of further limitation of the number and yield of tests. We note the call by the USSR for the next bilateral round to start in September next.

There is also the ongoing work of the Group of Scientific Experts. The GSE have indicated to the Conference on Disarmament their desire for proper political impetus and direction. We believe this is indeed opportune, since the occasion to do so presents itself now. The Netherlands has actively contributed to the work of the GSE. It is clear in our view that seismic methods are the corner-stone for effective verification of a future treaty. The experience with GSETT-2 will, in our opinion, be quite telling in this regard. Even with the limited detection capability in the Netherlands we were already able to identify 65 per cent of all underground nuclear explosions in 1989. International exchange of data will lead to substantial detection and identification capabilities.

In the CD there are a number of practical and specific steps in this regard that we could take: the President of the Conference could convey to the Chairman of the GSE a message of unconditional support for the work of the GSE and for the ongoing GSETT-2 experiment in particular; the CD could ask the GSE to make an assessment of present and potential seismic detection and identification capabilities. In the first GSE report such an assessment was made, but that is more than 10 years ago; nuclear-weapon States could be called upon to provide information about the precise time, location and yield of their nuclear tests. This information should be given soon after the nuclear test and be passed on to our respective national seismology divisions. It would help them considerably in their research.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

My third subject today is chemical weapons. Regrettably, we have to admit that negotiations on chemical weapons do not progress with the speed which we all desire. Perhaps this is inevitable, perhaps not. I would like to see it more philosophically, as a fact of our negotiating life in the CD. The achievement on a total ban of chemical weapons should indeed be the highest priority of this Conference. The Netherlands would therefore like to offer some suggestions for speeding up the negotiations.

In our view, the negotiations at this moment hinge on two major and interrelated issues, i.e. challenge inspections and routine inspections. Challenge and routine inspections are the two pillars which support one and the same basic structure which we all strive for: compliance with a chemical weapons ban. Challenge and routine inspections, including ad hoc verification, not only complement each other, but are also strongly interrelated. The more encompassing one system is, the less often we need the other.

We believe that the present "rolling text" pivots upon the concept of challenge inspections: the solution to this issue, which will mainly consist of the development of adequate procedures for managed access, might well put many other remaining problems into another, more benevolent light. My delegation is therefore very pleased with the conclusion of the British Minister of State, William Waldegrave, that in the view of the United Kingdom there is no site so sensitive from the national security viewpoint that some form of access within the site, appropriately managed, could not be allowed to an international inspection team. On a preliminary basis we came to the same conclusion. The fact that the United Kingdom could draw such a conclusion after six elaborate trial inspections in different types of sensitive installations - not one country has matched their efforts in this field - should be taken into account very seriously by all of us.

We believe that the problems of challenge inspections can only be solved through the medium of properly agreed procedures for managed access. If we concentrate on those, we might be able to solve the problems of the original and unique concept of challenge inspections: anytime, anywhere, without the right of refusal.

Why is that so important? Besides the fact that there exists an emerging consensus that challenge inspections are not just a unique method of last resort to determine compliance, the concept of challenge inspections has acquired not only a political, but also a philosophical connotation: it is opening up the world for arms control and disarmament; it is a real step towards our stated common goal: "general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". If we weaken the original character of challenge inspections, doubts would be raised about the effectiveness of the chemical weapons ban as a security treaty. Consequently, political support for the treaty would be lost. There are those who advocate a filter mechanism to determine whether a challenge request constitutes a "détournement de pouvoir". The Netherlands believes that the introduction of such filter mechanisms would seriously harm the effectiveness of challenge inspections.

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Legend has it that a hole in a dyke can be plugged with a finger. This is not so. From hard experience we have learned that, unless you build solid dykes, you will drown in the flood. For those who have serious national security problems, solutions can be found through properly negotiated and agreed procedures for managed access, as was proven by the United Kingdom. The example of the IAEA and the role accredited to its Board of Governors shows that rules and regulations can be found to secure an impartial and proper procedure for international investigations in national installations. We should proceed accordingly. It is not by talking neatly that we can convince other States. It is through their own experience and practice that States can eventually solve problem areas. We therefore urge States which have not yet done so to engage in such trial challenge inspections.

We ourselves have done the same. I take pleasure in presenting today our own report on the first trial challenge inspection at an operational air base in the Netherlands. The document will be distributed as CD/1018, concurrently CD/CW/WP.307. A more detailed introduction has already been given in the Ad hoc Committee yesterday.

The other pillar of our verification system is constituted by routine inspections. The "rolling text" provides for an elaborate system of such inspections that covers facilities which have been declared to produce scheduled chemicals. It does not, however, cover all those plants which are quite capable of producing chemical weapons and their precursors but which have not been declared.

Of course, such facilities would be subject to challenge inspections. My delegation, however, looks upon such inspections as a procedure of last resort: it is esential for the convention, but not for routine use. Easy access to the chemical industry, in a non-intrusive and routine manner, would be a confidence-building measure of major importance. The recent proposal by Australia on ad hoc verification would fully meet our concerns: it would establish the missing link in the envisaged verification system. It is therefore an element of great concern to the Netherlands Government to find that efforts are made to block further consideration of this issue, even before the different elements of the proposal have been properly discussed and elaborated. We, for our part, are determined to pursue this issue, which is an essential element of the verification system as a whole.

If my memory serves me right, it was the German Democratic Republic which had, on occasion, suggested that a ministerial meeting might be opportune to push our work further. At the time, the idea as such did not particularly appeal to us, as we would have preferred to solve the problems before any ministerial conference. In view of the structure of the CW negotiations and its prolonged history and of the fact that we do need results in the light of growing dangers of proliferation, we have come to the conclusion that a ministerial meeting might after all be worthwhile.

The CD could envisage such a meeting at the beginning of our negotiating period next year. On that occasion Ministers could not only set a deadline for the termination of the negotiations later that year, but also give directions on the lines along which problems should be solved. Second, Ministers might want to meet again later that year, just before the expiry of

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the deadline. The remaining problems would all have to be solved then and there. Ministers could then also consider the follow-up, including the manner in which universality of adherence to the convention could be achieved. In this context, it is proper to recall the intention of the North Atlantic allies, as stated in the final communiqué of the Turnberry ministerial meeting (document CD/1006), to be among the original signatories to the CW convention and to promote its early entry into force.

In the meantime, we here at the negotiating table have to do all we can to achieve consensus treaty language. We must make full use of any intersessional period that becomes available. And in the daily pursuit of our common responsibilities in establishing the desired chemical weapons ban, we should not shy away, where necessary, from vigorous action.

Finally, Mr. President, you will have noted the keen interest of the Netherlands in the issue of the seat of the chemical weapons treaty Organization. In a few weeks time I hope to be able to shed more light on the particular details of our proposition.

Mr. WAYARABI (Indonesia): As Ambassador Wisber Loeis has been unexpectedly called away to another important engagement, he has authorized me to read the statement of the Indonesian delegation on his behalf.

Allow me to associate myself with previous speakers in expressing the immense pleasure of the Indonesian delegation at seeing you, Sir, the representative of Poland, presiding over our deliberations for the month of July. Your skill and expertise have been much in evidence this month in guiding the work of the Conference to a successful conclusion. I would also like to take this opportunity to express my delegation's appreciation at the manner in which Ambassador de Rivero of Peru guided our work during the month of June. The Indonesian delegation would like to extend a warm welcome to Ambassador Ricupero of Brazil, Ambassador Indrajit Singh Chadha of India, Ambassador von Wagner of the Federal Republic of Germany, Ambassador Králik of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Ambassador Vaerno of Norway and Ambassador Pérez-Villanueva of Spain, who have joined us in this current session of the Conference on Disarmament. The Indonesian delegation looks forward to working with their respective delegations towards the attainment of our common goals.

I would like to avail myself of this opportunity to express the Indonesian delegation's regret at the departure of Ambassador Bayart of Mongolia, Ambassador Kostov of Bulgaria, Ambassador Truan Hoan of Viet Nam and Ambassador Varga of Hungary. Their wisdom and constructive contributions to the cause of disarmament will be missed by all of us. We wish them every success in their new undertakings.

It has been repeatedly said in this hall that the present session of the Conference is taking place in a unique and unprecedented international environment which has far-reaching repercussions on the subject under consideration, as well as on the most appropriate procedure to deal with them in the Conference. Indeed, events outside this room are offering much that is new and positive. The dynamics and magnitude of the changes have created a mixed sense of anxiety, earnest hope and sometimes impatience in this room during these last few months.

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All of these developments have been a source of expectation for further rapid progress in the work of this Conference. Yet, during these last two months of meetings we have become even more aware of the need to examine carefully those matters to be dealt with by the Conference at this crucial juncture. I fully accept that we need to pause for a few moments to seek ways and means to further progress. The ongoing informal open-ended consultations on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference under the able chairmanship of Ambassador Kamal of Pakistan are a timely necessity and merit our full support.

As regards the matters under discussion at these informal open-ended consultations, in my earlier statement I had the opportunity to express my views concerning the agenda for the Conference. I wish also to state that as for the procedural changes in the conduct of the CD sessions, particularly the "CD sessions schedule" and "the plenary meeting schedule", my delegation has an open mind.

As for the schedule of the CD sessions, I wish to reiterate that the objective in changing the present timetable of the Conference is to increase the effectiveness of its work. Observations made on the present system have noted that two weeks are always set aside at the beginning of each session of the Conference for a form of "preparatory work". During this two week period the Conference moves so slowly and no substantial discussion is carried out. Unless we are ready to start the discussions at an earlier date in any given Conference session, the rescheduling would only introduce three periods of "preparatory work" instead of two in the present system.

In this connection, my delegation is pleased to note the establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban. In this respect, I wish to pay tribute to Ambassador Donowaki of Japan, and to his predecessor, Ambassador Yamada, as well as to the President of the Conference for the month of July, Ambassador Sujka of Poland, for their tireless endeavours to finally establish the Committee.

It is to be noted that the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban only started working in the second week of July and will continue during the first two weeks of August. There will be only four weeks left for the Committee to discuss matters relevant to its work prior to the period when the Conference starts discussing its report to the United Nations General Assembly. The four weeks envisaged will be quite insufficient for even an elaboration of a programme of work, let alone for a discussion on substantive issues. I suggest, therefore, that the very precious time still available be fully utilized to discuss and decide matters relevant to the future work of the Committee. We should take a decision by the end of this summer session on the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the beginning of the next spring session, in order that the work towards the total elimination of nuclear testing is undertaken as expeditiously as possible.

In discussing the question of a nuclear test ban, I wish to refer to the contents of the preambular paragraphs of the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty. It should be recalled that the original parties proclaimed as one of their principal aims the speediest possible achievement of an agreement which would eliminate the incentive to produce and test all kinds of weapons, including

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nuclear weapons. It is solemnly accepted therefore that the ultimate objective of the PTBT is a total ban on all nuclear tests. Within the Conference, as well as in New York, attempts have been made for some years now to lead us to that goal. With the decision to convene the PTBT amendment conference, avenues are open to us today both in this Conference and in New York. Yet, the establishment of an Ad hoc Committee in the Conference and the forthcoming PTBT amendment conference should not infringe on one another. The work of the Ad hoc Committee and that of the PTBT amendment conference to be held in January 1991 should, on the contrary, be in tandem with, and mutually complement each other.

Indonesia has long since adhered to the Treaty and has never sought nuclear weapons options for its defence purposes. In the light of the latest developments in this Conference, as well as of the preparations for the amendment conference of the PTBT, my delegation entertains optimism that universal acceptance of the stand taken by the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States, including my own, will hopefully gain ground in the near future. The era in which the major protagonists have overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion and mutual distrust does not need any nuclear weapons.

During these past few years there has been widely shared expectation that the chemical weapons convention is within reach. The insertion of the provisions concerning the annex on chemicals and the protocol on inspection procedures in the "rolling text" of last year, as well as the achievements accomplished during the spring session on matters relating to verification, have further increased the grounds for optimism. At this summer session, my delegation has also noted with satisfaction the efforts of the Ad hoc Committee's Chairman, Ambassador Hyltenius, in trying to set provisions concerning on-site inspection on request by a State or States parties to another State party. The idea to amend the well-known wording of "challenge inspection" to "inspection on request" is constructive. As I mentioned in my previous statement, this type of verification should not be conducted on the basis of a strong motivation of suspicion. The idea to abandon the use of the word "challenge" would lessen the notion of suspicion in the implementation of this set of provisions.

Admittedly, much progress has already been achieved on the elaboration of the detailed provisions of numerous parts of the convention. Moreover, the setting of the provisions, which are relevant to the latest developments in the relations among States, has also been attempted with regard to inspection on request.

A slight apprehension has, however, emerged recently concerning the pace of progress in the negotiations. For a country like my own which has never produced or possessed chemical weapons - nor will it ever - the idea of linking the destruction of all chemical weapons to the adherence of certain categories of States has caused uncertainty concerning the desired universal adherence to the Convention. Such a linkage could, I believe, lead to the continuing existence of such weapons by, inter alia, inducing States which have not possessed chemical weapons to acquire them prior to the entry into force of the convention. Such an approach also implies legitimizing acts of coercion of a weaker State or States by a stronger State, thence endangering the goal of universal adherence. There is a shared conviction that one of the

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most feasible ways to attract the adherence of States which as a result of particular circumstances possess - or will possess - chemical weapons lies in the need to set up an appropriate approach to discourage such States from choosing the chemical weapons option.

There is also widespread belief that, as we wish to conclude a convention with universal adherence, then we should, indeed, consider the interests of the majority of States which do not possess, or intend to possess, chemical weapons. This implies that the convention should provide a guarantee for the unimpeded right of every State party to develop, produce, use, exchange and transfer chemicals and chemical technology for peaceful purposes. The convention should not hinder international co-operation, nor trade in chemicals for peaceful purposes.

As a non-chemical-weapon State, my country has always stood - and will continue to do so - for the total prohibition and destruction of all existing chemical weapons. Although we do not possess such weapons, there is a foreseeable possibility that we might have to destroy chemical weapons which were abandoned in our territory. As this matter is going to be taken up in further consultations, my delegation would only wish to reiterate its deeply held principle that the discovering State should not be burdened with the responsibility of destroying the abandoned chemicals.

My delegation was made even more aware of the magnitude of the difficulty of protecting civilians, as well as other targets from a chemical weapon attack, when visiting the Münster chemical weapons destruction and training facilities thanks to the generous invitation of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. We indeed realize that such protective actions which are to be carried out in a dense tropical area such as my own country would be a tremendously delicate and costly task. Despite the need for assistance deriving from the foreseeable difficulties, it is also my belief that a commitment for compulsory assistance from the "haves" to the "have nots", constitutes a means of deterring from the use or threat of use of chemical weapons. My country therefore attaches great importance to the inclusion in the future convention of a provision for assistance which could fully satisfy the imperative need for such assistance in case of attack or threat of attack of chemical weapons.

A convention which is effective and verifiable and which attracts universal adherence requires a verification system which creates confidence among States parties with regard to compliance with the convention. Such a verification system needs first of all a set of solid routine verification régimes, and I believe that the establishment of an inspection system which permits the conduct of an inspection measure to ensure compliance by any State party at any time and at any place is also necessary. Since the establishment of these sets of verification systems is the subject of intensive negotiations, my delegation would prefer that all members of the Conference be invited to finalize the establishment of those two sets of verification systems before we embark upon examination of other verification systems.

(Mr. Wayarabi, Indonesia)

The positive consequences of disarmament for development efforts have been widely recognized for a long time. It is a truism that the continuity of the arms race among nations absorbs far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources. Studies carried out by United Nations experts, as well as by other groups or individuals, have shown that the arms race places a heavy burden on the economies of all countries and affects the international flow of trade, finance and technology, and thereby hinders the process of confidence-building among States developed and developing alike.

Despite the magnitude of military expenditure, which still contrasts dramatically with economic and social under-development, misery and poverty, there are new and positive developments toward the reduction of armaments. This, of course, would allow a greater redeployment of resources used for the arms race to development. There is currently a common willingness to seek security at lower levels of armaments and to find ways to reduce national and regional military expenditure.

The readiness for far-reaching arms control and even for a set of disarmament measures on the part of those developed nations which are heavy armed makes it possible for the States concerned not only to achieve significant budgetary savings but also to put economic development as a priority. In a more relaxed security environment those States could formulate an integrated national, as well as regional, economic strategy without worrying whether it jeopardized military considerations. There is a profound necessity among statesmen and those engaged in the field of disarmament, however, to awaken the spirit of internationalism. This spirit would be particularly prone to opposing any overestimation of national defence expenditure on the grounds that the decrease in international tension should lead to a reallocation of defence expenditure for international development.

My delegation was greatly interested by the proposal of President Richard von Weizsäcker and former Chancellor Willy Brandt envisaging the reallocation for economic growth in developing countries of one third of the resources saved from military cuts as a consequence of a unified Germany. Likewise, my delegation was also attracted by the proposal of the President of the World Bank in his speech recently suggesting that developed nations should ideally reduce their military expenditure by 10-15 per cent, thereby enabling themselves to redouble their assistance to the developing nations in carrying out their development programmes. Such moves should enjoy world-wide support.

This present decade will be a decade of change, challenges and hope. I believe, therefore, that the unprecedented opportunities that are opening up at the end of this century should not be squandered.

The PRESIDENT: I thank the representative of Indonesia for his statement and for the kind words he addressed to the Chair.

I have no other speakers inscribed for today. Does any other delegation wish to take the floor? This is not the case.

(The President)

The secretariat has circulated today the timetable of meetings of the Conference and its subsidiary bodies during the coming week. As usual, the timetable has been prepared in consultation with the chairmen of the Ad hoc Committees. It is merely indicative and subject to change, if the need arises. If there is no objection, I shall take it that the Conference adopts the timetable as proposed.

I give the floor to the distinguished representative of Japan.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): I understand that this schedule is subject to change and, as we all know, the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1 is to meet on Friday afternoon, which is not convenient to many delegations as it is the end of the week. If we can find any other slot, I would like to discuss that with the chairmen of other Committees and, if possible, I would like to request that the time be changed. Of course, that does not mean that the number of meetings for the Ad hoc Committee itself will be reduced, but please allow me to explore the possibility.

The PRESIDENT: It seems to me that we should do everything possible to meet your requirements.

I recognize the distinguished representative of the United States.

Mr. LEDOGAR (United States of America): On behalf of my country, I would like to underline the point that was just made by the Chairman of the Ad hoc Committee on agenda item 1. Speaking for ourselves, due to the international time difference between Geneva and the east coast of North America, we have a very special problem with the encumbrance of Friday afternoon with work on this important Committee and, judging by the statements we have heard today, Tuesday and previously, a high priority seems to be given by the Conference to the work of this newly established Ad hoc Committee. Our problem is that, without Friday afternoon, there is no way we can have adequate instructions by the following Monday on fast developments unless we report early. Accordingly, I have to say that United States concurrence with the proposed schedule is provisional upon the understanding that serious efforts will be made to avoid repetition of the encumbrance of Friday afternoon in the future.

The PRESIDENT: I am assured by the distinguished Personal Representative of the Secretary-General that the secretariat will take this into account on the understanding that this should be done in co-operation with the chairmen of other subsidiary bodies. This is in addition to the promise made by the secretariat. On this understanding, may I consider that this provisional informal timetable for next week meets with agreement around the negotiating table?

It was so decided.

I have no other business for today and I intend now to adjourn this plenary meeting. The next plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will be held on Tuesday, 31 July, at 10 a.m. The plenary meeting stands adjourned.

The meeting rose at 11.20 a.m.